Throughout my time in pastoral ministry, undoubtedly one of the most challenging questions which I have encountered is, “How could a good God allow so much evil and suffering in the world?” In our greatest moments of pain, it is natural to cry out, “Why, Lord?” (indeed, many of the Psalms record honest expressions of confusion and anguish). And yet, within the Christian worldview, there are robust and thoughtful responses to this question. Whilst studying for an MA in Theology a couple of years ago, I wanted to explore the theodicy of St. Augustine (354–430 A.D.) in more detail, to see how he wrestled with the problem of evil. Whilst his arguments aren’t flawless (whose are?), I’ve gleaned some very useful insights from Augustine’s perspective on this complex issue, which has been beneficial both personally and also in the context of ministry. I have included an excerpt from my essay below.

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Augustine and the Problem of Evil

Before evaluating Augustine’s response to the problem of evil, we shall provide a brief overview of this historic objection to Christianity. The ‘trilemma’ of the problem of evil is traditionally attributed to the Greek philosopher Epicurus (341-270 BCE). He expressed it thus: “God either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or he is able and unwilling; or he is nether willing nor able, or he is both willing and able” (Epicurus, in Groothuis, 616).The fundamental question that the problem of evil poses to the Christian, is the challenge to belief in an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God. It can be summarised as follows:

• If God exists, then God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent.
• If God is willing but is unable to eradicate evil, then he is not omnipotent, and is therefore not God.
• If God is able but is unwilling to eradicate evil, then he is not omnibenevolent, and is therefore not God.
• If God is neither willing nor able eradicate evil, then he is neither omnipotent nor omnibenevolent, and is therefore not God.
• If God is both willing and able to eradicate evil, why then does it continue to exist?

This argument challenges the Christian concept of God, who is portrayed as being both omnipotent (Psalm 147:5, Luke 1:37) and omnibenevolent (Psalm 34:8, Mark 10:18), and who nevertheless presides over a universe where evil exists. Given the prevalence of evil in the world, it is not surprising that the problem of evil has been described as the most significant intellectual objection to theistic belief for at least the last century and a half (Hasker, 2008, 15; Craig and Moreland, 2003, 536).       
            We can distinguish between the logical problem of evil and the probabilisticproblem of evil. In the logical version of the problem of evil, the argument is proposed that God’s existence is logically incompatible with the presence of evil in the universe. J.L. Mackie (1917-1981) was a well-known proponent of the logical problem of evil in the twentieth century, and stated that evil could not coexist with an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God (Mackie, 1955, 200). The second version of this argument is the probabilistic view of the problem of evil. Those who concede that the existence of evil can be logically consistent with God’s existence, may still argue that it is nevertheless highly unlikely. Thus God’s existence is not impossible but rather improbable (Plantinga, 1979, 1). This was argued by Cornman and Lehrer, when they stated: “What surely seems to be unnecessary evilin this world provides inductive evidencefor the belief that God does not exist, because it is probable that if he once existed he would have created a different world and that if he now exists he would control the course of nature so as to avoid many pernicious events that do occur” (Cornman and Lehrer, 1969, 340-341). As the proposal is more modest than the logical problem of evil, it provides a greater challenge to the theist.  As we shall see, Augustine’s response to Manicheanism addresses both of these versions of the argument, although his case is more successful against the logical problem of evil than the probabilistic form. Before evaluating the effectiveness of Augustine’s theodicy, we shall provide a brief overview of his life to situate him in his historical context.

Augustine and Manichaeism

Augustine of Hippo (354–430) is widely regarded as one of the most significant and influential theologians of the early Church. He was a Manichean teacher of rhetoric and Latin literature, first in Carthage and later in Rome. Manichaeism was founded by a Babylonian prophet named Mani (261-277), and in the fourth century it achieved a great degree of missionary success in the Roman empire. As it grew in strength and numbers, it came to be viewed as a major Christian heresy (Lieu, 1992, 7). Augustine was such a devoted follower of Manichaeism that he converted several friends to his own religion (Chadwick, 1986, 14).      
            Manichaeism maintained that the universe was created by two equal and eternal beings: a good God, and an evil ‘King of Darkness’. These two beings were believed to be engaged in a perpetual battle, in which neither one had yet gained supremacy over the other. The material world functioned as an area for this cosmic battle to take place, and it was believed that ‘evil’ had trapped the forces of ‘goodness’ in matter. Thus it was maintained that the human body was evil, whilst the soul was good, and had to be liberated from the body by obeying Manichaean teaching (Calder, 2022, 2.1, Greenlees, 2007, 4). This view is evident in Mani’s statement: “The Good Source dwelt in the Region of Light…but the Evil Source, named the “King of Darkness’, he was dwelling in his Dark Earth” (Greenlees, 2007, 2-3). A Manichean response / solution to the ‘traditional’ problem of evil could thus be summarised as follows: (i) Two gods exist, one good and one evil, neither of whom are omnipotent; and (ii) Evil exists, as a direct consequence of the will of the evil god.        
            After several years teaching rhetoric in Rome, Augustine began to have serious doubts about the claims of Manichaeism, particularly as he considered whether it was right to worship a deity who was impotent in the face of evil. He became more disillusioned with Manichaeism when he met one of its chief proponents, Faustus, who was unable to provide adequate answers to his various theological questions (Augustine, Confessions, book 5, ch. 3). Augustine wrestled with the implications of evil and the doctrine of God, describing his restlessness with Manichean doctrine as being “stuck in the dark world of false beliefs” (Augustine, Confessions, book 3, ch. 11). He later rejected Manichean philosophy as completely false. After abandoning his faith in Manicheanism, Augustine eventually experienced a conversion to Christianity. Thereafter, Augustine viewed Manichaeism as a major opponent to orthodox Christianity, and a considerable portion of his writings offered a critique of Manichean theology (Rist, 1994, 261).    
            The theodicy of Manichaeism presented a serious challenge to the orthodox Christian response to the problem of evil. By proposing the dualistic concept of two gods, one evil and the other good, it denied the Christian doctrine of God’s oneness (Deuteronomy 6:4, 1 Corinthians 8:6). Moreover, it also challenged the Christian doctrine of the omnipotence of God: that God is all-powerful and authoritative over the universe that He has created (Isaiah 14:27, Job 42:1-2). The Manichean solution to the problem of evil was therefore to propose that God was not omnipotent, but that the good god was powerless to overcome the malevolent god who perpetuated evil in the world. As Mani stated: “God was alarmed at the mass charge; for He had no fire to strike with bolts and lightnings, nor water to cause a flood” (Greenlees, 2007, 6). Given this resolute challenge to the Christian doctrine of God, it is little surprise that Augustine focussed his attention on responding to his Manichean opponents.

Augustine’s Critique of Manichean Theodicy          

There are three primary aspects of Augustine’s theodicy which serve as an effective apologetic and critique of Manichean theodicy, which we shall examine in turn. First, Augustine’s definition of evil was, in itself, a potent rebuttal to the Manichean conceptions of God and evil. He defined evil as ‘privatio boni’ or “the removal of good”, directly defying the Manichean idea that evil existed in its own right as a substance, created by a malevolent god (Augustine, City of God, XIV, 11). For example, he argued that the evil of a wound which afflict animals is not in itself a substance, but rather a defect in the substance of flesh and the absenceof health (Augustine, Enchiridion, 1999, 40). As Mann rightly states, Augustine’s doctrine of creation is central to his understanding of evil as privation, most significantly, “that God creates ex nihilo, out of nothing, and that everything that God creates is good (Mann, 2001, 41).” If Augustine had conceded with the Manicheans that evil was a substance, he would have had great difficulty in defending the doctrine of God’s omnibenevolence. Yet by arguing that evil was a privationof good, Augustine was able to both refute the Manichean idea that there was an evil god who produced the ‘substance’ of evil, and still maintain that the entirety of the universe was created by a good, all-powerful God. He thus offered a credible argument as to why God was not necessarily the author of evil.

Second, Augustine proposed what may be described as the ‘Free-Will defence’ in response to the problem of evil. If evil is a privation of good, and is not caused by God, then the question arises as to where it does come from. Augustine argued that evil originated out of the free will given by God to his creation: “The cause of evil is the defection of the will of a being who is mutably good from the Good which is immutable. This happened first in the case of the angels and, afterwards, that of man” (Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 8, 23). It is worth noting that Augustine’s argument extended to both ‘moral’ evils (evil that arises from the actions of created beings with moral agency, namely angels and humans), and ‘natural evil’ (evil arising from aspects of creation with no moral agency). For Augustine, the cause of both kinds of evil could be traced back primarily to the Fall of Adam and Eve in Genesis 3:1-24. As a direct consequence of Adam’s sin, not only was natural evil introduced into the world, but Adam’s descendants thereafter became bound by ‘original sin’ (Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 8, 26). Thus the argument followed that no suffering could ultimately be described as ‘undeserved’: since all human beings are deemed guilty, then all are deserving of punishment, and indeed it would be unjust to withhold punishment for those who have committed evil (Rist, 1994, 273).     
            This is a clear example of Augustine offering an intelligent critique of Manichean theodicy. For in proposing this view, Augustine was able to simultaneously uphold the doctrines of God’s omnipotence and omnibenevolence, andthe reality of evil in the world, by placing the responsibility for evil upon the actions of human beings. God is therefore not a powerless observer in the face of evil, unable to intervene to prevent it, as per the Manichean vision. Nor is he an all-powerful but corrupt or morally compromised being. Instead, through the gift of free will, God had delegated responsibility to human beings for their own behaviour. Indeed, Augustine maintained that human free will is the cause of evil and that God’s just judgment is the cause of human beings suffering from its consequences (Augustine, Confessions, book 7, ch. 3).
            Third, Augustine advanced what may be called his ‘Aesthetic’ argument for the existence of evil. This is the argument that, when the presence of evil is considered alongside the totality of goodness in the universe, then overall the universe is good.  One important aspect of his argument was to account for the existence of ‘imperfections’ in the world. Some creatures are evidently created with greater qualities (such as intelligence, beauty, and talent) which result in advantages for some, and disadvantages for others: does this not constitute evil? Augustine responded by arguing that a universe containing every possible variety of creatures, from the highest to the lowest, is a better universe than would be one consisting solely of the highest kind of created being: “From things earthly to things heavenly, from the visible to the invisible, there are some things better than others; and for this purpose are they unequal, in order that they might all exist” (Augustine, City of God, Vol. 2, ch. 22). Augustine’s argument is not without criticism on this point. As Hick has noted, whilst the world does indeed contain a rich abundance of different kinds of creatures, it does not contain every conceivableform of life, such as unicorns, mermaids, or centaurs (Hick, 2007, 79). Nevertheless, this argument still carefully demonstrated that it is logically possible that God could have a good purpose for differences among creatures in terms of resources, abilities, and status. At the very least, it provides a viable alternative perspective to the cosmic dualism of Manichaeism.   
            A more contested dimension to Augustine’s aesthetic argument for evil, was that not just mere imperfection, but even evil itself could be construed as being ‘part’ of a beautiful ‘whole’:

“All are directed by their functions, their duties and their ends towards the beauty of the whole universe, so that if what shocks us in the part is considered together with the whole, it gives us entire satisfaction…just as the colour black in a picture becomes beautiful within the whole, so too the immutable providence of God puts on a worthy production of this whole contest by assigning one part to the vanquished, another to the contestants, another to the winners, another to the spectators”      (Augustine, On Christian Belief, ch. 40, 76).

Thus Augustine concludes that the universe which God has created, even with its sinister aspects, is perfect. This argument amounts to a decisive development of the apostle Paul’s comment that “all things work together for good to those who love God” (Romans 8:28). However, the aesthetic argument for the existence of evil appears to be difficult to defend, particularly when attempting to discern the aesthetic value of certain kinds of evil. It is hard to see, for example, in what sense evil and injustice on the scale of the atrocities of the twentieth century, such as the Nazi Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide, could ever contribute to the beauty of the universe. Moreover, critics have pointed out that Augustine’s argument concerning the ‘harmony’ of the universe, integrating good and evil, is flawed because it cannot sustain the theological weight of the doctrine of hell: God’s punishment of sinners may be just, but could it be described as ‘beautiful’? (Sohn, 2007, 47). Furthermore, whilst it may address the logical problem of evil, critics may argue that the probabilistic problem of evil is not adequately addressed by the aesthetic argument. Indeed, the reality that there is so much evil and suffering has caused some to suggest that the metaphorical ‘beautiful painting’ of the universe is far too blotted by the darkness of evil (Rowe, 1979, 241).
            Yet whilst the aesthetic argument is not without its faults, it is still useful in Augustine’s apologetical response to Manichaeism. Commenting on this aspect of Augustine’s argument, Rowan Williams observes: “Certainly, the aesthetic is a significant contribution…The darkness of sin in itself is terrible, but yet the entire universe does not, because of it, cease to reflect the order of God’s wisdom (Williams, 2000, 115). As Augustine argued, we need not ever see evil itself as being in some way ‘good.’ However, at the same time, in God’s sovereignty, the process by which the greatest light is displayed can and does include the prevalence of various shades of darkness. Thus the main achievement of the aesthetic theme within Augustine’s theodicy is to contend that God’s omnipotence and omnibenevolence can be held together, even when human beings cannot fully understand the particular meaning of evil, because of God’s divine, aesthetic purpose. The aesthetic component of Augustine’s theodicy effectively addressed the logical problem of evil, if not providing a comprehensive solution to the probabilistic problem.    

Conclusion

Overall, Augustine had a great degree of success in arguing against the logical problem of evil presented to him by his contemporary Manichean opponents. Augustine’s brilliance as a theologian and apologist lay partly in his ability to directly address the ideas which were of the greatest concern and relevance to his own time and context.    Whilst it may yield fascinating insights for a student of church history, it would be ill-conceived for contemporary apologetics to address the arguments of an ancient religion such as Manichaeism, when it poses little threat to Christianity today. However, the perennial nature of the problem of evil means that contemporary questions are still consistently being asked of Christian theodicy, and Augustine’s insights are invaluable when constructing a contemporary Christian theodicy or defence in this area. Indeed, one of the most influential Christian philosophers of the last fifty years, Alvin Plantinga, acknowledges his indebtedness to Augustine’s theodicy in his own work on the problem of evil, recognising him as “one of the greatest…philosopher-theologians of the Christian Church” (Plantinga, 1989, 1.a.4). Whilst Plantinga distinguishes his approach from that of Augustine, he nevertheless builds upon the legacy of his theodicy, and has no reservation in using his writings as a rich theological resource for the construction of his own ‘Free Will Defence’ (Plantinga, 1989, 1.a.4).          
            Augustine’s aesthetic argument is unlikely to completely satisfy critics who will argue that a beautiful universe would have been not only possible but more plausible without the presence of evil. However, he had greater success in contending against the logical problem of evil. Central to his theodicy was his redefinition of evil as the privation of good, thereby contesting the accusation that evil had been ‘created’ by a malevolent god. Even more significant was Augustine’s development of the ‘Free Will Defence’, which simultaneously addressed the Manichean objections to the doctrines of God’s omnibenevolence and omnipotence. God was neither the author of evil, nor impotent, because agency had been delegated to free human beings who were themselves able to use and abuse their freedom to commit evil acts. Not only did Augustine provide a rational, intelligent critique of Manichean theodicy, but he provided an alternative Christian worldview which surpassed Manichean theology because it upheld God’s essential divine properties. Therefore, whilst not without its limitations, Augustine’s theodicy nevertheless sufficiently demonstrates the claim that a credible Christian apologetic necessarily entails an intelligent critique of contemporary cultural phenomena.     

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